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PRIVILEGE IN THE UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE
RALPH C. BARNHART*
The Uniform Rules of Evidence present a remarkable accomplish-
ment in bringing the law of evidence within the compass of a set of
simple statements of general rules. The object of writing these rules
to constitute a coherent whole was a grand one. The law of evidence
did not develop as a coherent body of law. Much of it probably
developed as much by accident as by design, and its welter of incon-
sistencies and disunity has justly been called a conglomeration
or worse. While the work of reducing conglomeration to order was
sorely needed, simplification is never easy. One area of evidence law
which is, perhaps, less susceptible of being brought into coherent
statement with other parts of the law is the area dealing with
privilege. The amalgamation of privilege with the other areas of
evidence into a single consistent whole was a formidable task.
When lawyers talk and write about privilege, they think of it
in somewhat different ways than they do in the case of other rules
of evidence. Rules having to do with the exclusion and admission
of some types of hearsay, or rules requiring that in order to be usable
evidence must have a greater or lesser degree of logical probity, or
rules requiring that objections be stated in such a way that the court
and opposing counsel have some notion of the ground of the objection
seem to be a natural part of the belligerent business characterized
generally as the adversary process. If we accept Morgan's thesis
that rules of evidence exist because of this adversary method of trying
lawsuits, rather than the Thayer-Wigmore view that rules of evidence
are necessary because of the institution of the jury, the distinction
between classes of evidence seems clearer.1 The exclusionary rules
are logical weapons of litigious combat. They enable alert and con-
scientious counsel to avoid having a case built against their clients
out of unreliable, misleading or improperly prejudicial evidence, and
they can guide intelligent and orderly preparation and presentation on
behalf of counsel's own clients. Correctly applied, they do not operate
unfairly. Each side has the obligation of presenting his own case
according to the rules and each side is entitled to insist that the other
do the same. Each may protect himself by timely and proper appeal
to the trial judge. Properly used, these rules help the factfinding
process and avoid useless expenditure of time. For a long time critical
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law.
1 Morgan, "The jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence," 4 U. Chi. L. Rev.
247 (1936).
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commentary has pointed out that our rules of evidence do not constitute
a consistent whole, that some are contradictory even within a single
rule, that it is questionable whether some of them really serve the
purpose for which they were presumably formulated, and that some
may keep out as much good evidence as bad.2 These faults can be
corrected; the adoption of the Uniform Rules of Evidence would go
a long way toward elimination of the more obvious faults, but even
the faults do not obscure the thoroughly good purpose served by the
rules of evidence in getting at the facts in the circumstances in which
litigation is carried on. The suggestion from time to time that the
law of evidence is so involved that it would be best to get rid of it
altogether has never on sober thought been seriously considered.
Improve it we must, but we do not want to face the serious task of
trying our clients' cases without the protection that the rules give
against the sort of evidence that unscrupulous or unprincipled adver-
saries might use. Much has been done to clean up the process of
factfinding through the simplification of pleading, the easing of the
technical rules of variance and amendment, and the development of
pre-trial discovery. We continue to depend upon an adversary system
while slowly refining it of its crudities. We believe that the rules of
evidence and our pre-trial procedures serve the cause of truth, or at
least the cause of expeditious trial of lawsuits.
When we come to the rules by which witnesses are privileged
not to testify or by which relevant, non-misleading, non-prejudicial
evidence may be barred on the basis of a right on the part of someone
to keep the witness from the stand or to keep the evidence from being
disclosed in court, we are dealing with something different. Rules
which keep an accused from the stand, or bar testimony of a spouse,
or render illegally obtained evidence inadmissible are not strictly tools
of adversary proceedings. Often the person who benefits from the
exercise of the rule is not a party to the litigation. One of the adver-
saries may be pleased by the exercise of the privilege or disappointed
if the privilege is not claimed, but in either event he seems to have
received or been denied a windfall having nothing to do with winning
or losing or even with his care or lack of care in preparation of the
case. As often as not the privilege helps the wrong person. This
does not seem to comport with the notion of fair combat. Advantage
may go without regard to the skill or diligence of counsel. The case
of the party who is helped or hurt has no relation to the basis of the
2 E. G. Cleary, "What's Wrong With the Law of Evidence," 15 Ark. L. Rev. 11
(1960). Important here, of course, is Morgan, The Law of Evidence-Some Proposals
for Its Reform (1927).
[Vol. 24
UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE
privilege. Hence Wigmore's famous Titus-Flavious complaint of re-
versing Titus' conviction to teach Flavious not to violate the consti-
tution.3 The great Wigmore thought that this embodied a mechanical
idea of justice.
Nevertheless the privileges were developed as part of the law of
evidence as it was hammered out by judges and lawyers as they tried
lawsuits by the adversary method. These privileges and the policies
which sustain them are, in general, judge-made and judge-declared.
They may now be embodied in constitutional and statutory provisions,
but they were not so created. They were not imposed by legislative
enactment upon a reluctant bench and bar.4 They came about as part of
the process of litigation and factfinding. They must have developed
out of a somewhat different spirit than they have encountered in more
recent times or it would seem that they would not have developed at all.
Now the sentiment of the writers is to say that whereas the rules of exclu-
sion were designed to facilitate the ascertainment of the facts by
guarding against unreliable or prejudicial or misleading evidence, the
rules of privilege have no such purpose. "They do not in any wise aid
the ascertainment of truth," says McCormick, "but rather they shut
out the light."5 "Every such privilege given legal sanction closes the
door to sources of reliable evidence, hampers the legal investigatory
process and increases the margin of error in factfinding results."'
Wigmore begins his treatment of the subject of privilege by asserting
that there is a positive duty to give testimony:
When we come to examine the various claims of exemption, we
start with the primary assumption that there is a general duty to
give what testimony one is capable of giving and that any exemp-
tions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many
derogations from a positive general rule. . . . It follows . . . that
all privileges of exemption from this duty are exceptional, and are
therefore to be discountenanced. . . . They should be recognized
only within the narrowest limits required by principle. Every step.
beyond these limits helps to provide, without any real necessity, an
obstacle to the administration of justice.7
Professor Morgan in the Foreword of the Model Code says:
If a privilege to suppress the truth is to be recognized at all, its
3 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2184a n.1 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
Wigmorel.
4 The physician-patient privilege is of course an exception. Uniform Rule of Evi-
dence 27 (comment).
5 McCormick, Evidence § 72 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McCormick].
6 Gard, "Kansas Law and the New Uniform Rules of Evidence," 2 Kan. L. Rev.
332, 351 (1954).
7 8 Wigmore § 2192.
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limits should be sharply determined so as to coincide with the limits
of the benefits it creates. . . . In many decisions this principle is
disregarded, sentiment serves for judgment, and rhetoric is sub-
stituted for reason.
There is appellate judicial opinion expressing the same attitude.
McCormick quotes Learned Hand:
The suppression of truth is a grievous necessity at best, more
especially when as here the inquiry concerns the public interest;
it can be justified at all only when the opposed private interest is
supreme.8
Again, what is supreme may depend upon the point of view. One
or the other of the parties to a dispute may see little or no benefit to
be derived from a stray witness's claim of privilege while the witness
may feel that his privilege is paramount and fail to appreciate the
importance of the lawsuit itself.
Despite these reservations concerning testimonial privileges in
our law of evidence, not much has been accomplished in the way
of eliminating them. If anything the house of privilege is extending
itself, or at least there is pressure to increase the area or extent of
privilege, resistence to which calls forth judicial and other expressions
such as those quoted.
The Uniform Rules of Evidence, promulgated in 1953, began its
statement of the rules of privilege with Rule 7: General Abolition
of Disqualifications and Privileges of Witnesses, and of Exclusionary
Rules. According to the comment this rule "wipes the slate clean of
all disqualifications of witnesses, privileges and limitations on the
admissibility of relevant evidence. Then harmony and uniformity
are achieved by writing back on the slate the limitations and exceptions
desired." When the draftsmen got through writing the privileges back
onto the slate they remained much as they were before the slate had
been wiped clean. The Rules retained the privilege against self-
incrimination (Rules 23, 24 and 25), the lawyer-client privilege
(Rule 26), the physician-patient privilege (Rule 27), the marital
privilege for confidential communications (Rule 28), the priest-penitent
privilege (Rule 29), a privilege for refusing to disclose religious belief
(Rule 30), a privilege not to disclose one's political vote (Rule 31),
the privilege protecting trade secrets (Rule 33), the rule protecting
official information from disclosure (Rule 34), the privilege to refuse
8 McMann v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1937),
quoted in McCormick § 74, n.3.
For a view sympathetic to the privileges, see Louisell, "Confidentiality, Conformity
and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today," 31 Tul. L. Rev. 101 (1956).
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to disclose communications made to a grand jury (Rule 35), and the
privilege of refusing to disclose the identity of an informer (Rule 36).
The Uniform Rules were built upon the Model Code of Evidence
and Rule 7 was the adoption of the same device as was utilized by
the Model Code draftsmen in Code Rule 9, which its draftsmen said
"clears the ground by abolishing all disqualifications of witnesses, all
privileges to refuse to testify and to refuse to disclose evidential
material and all rules which exclude relevant evidence."9  This
common pattern of "clearing the ground" or "wiping the slate clean"
of all obstructions to admissibility of relevant evidence by way of
disqualification of witnesses, privileges, or of exclusionary rules, sought
to adopt Thayer's approach to the law of evidence that basically all
relevant evidence is prima facie admissible and that obstructions to
the admission of relevant evidence are therefore exceptional. The
draftsmen of the Model Code of Evidence, the record shows,10 had
considerable doubts about a great deal of the law of privilege and
would have preferred to eliminate much of it, but when the final draft
was approved, most of it had been kept. As summed up by the
reporter, Professor Edmond M. Morgan, "The common-law and statu-
tory privileges have been carefully re-examined and have in great
measure been retained in the Code with important modifications.""
The privilege for illegally obtained evidence, however, was not
included. The draftsman has stated that this privilege, as well as the
privilege against self-incrimination which was included, is a consti-
tutional privilege and constitutional construction rather than legis-
lative or judicial rule will have to be the guide for defining it.'2 Under
recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court,13 the same can
also be said of the limitations on the admissibility of confessions,
treated in the Uniform Rules under the orthodox classification of
exceptions to the hearsay rule.
It was probably unfortunate that this somewhat unsympathetic
approach of the Model Code to the evidentiary privileges was ostensibly
adopted by the Uniform Rules. It proved to be an unacceptable
approach to the majority of the membership of the American Law
9 Model Code of Evidence rule 9 (comment) (1942).
10 19 ALI Proceedings 187 (1941-1942).
11 Model Code of Evidence 7 (Foreword by Professor Morgan).
12 Gard, "Why Oregon Lawyers Should Be Interested in the Uniform Rules of
Evidence," 37 Ore. L. Rev. 287, 290 (1958).
13 Among the latest are Rogers v. Richmond, 265 U.S. 534 (1961); Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); and Spano
v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). These cases lend support to the view expressed
by McCormick (§ 75) that the rules as to confessions fall into the class of privilege.
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Institute at the time of the drafting of the Model Code and it gained
no additional acceptance in the years before the Uniform Rules were
drafted. The latter included all of the common-law privileges included
in the former and retreated somewhat in the matter of comment. 4
The experience of writing these two statements of rules, with the
accompanying study and comment, has demonstrated that the privi-
leges are hardy plants. Despite scholarly criticism the battle has
apparently become one, not of eliminating the old privileges, but of
keeping new ones from coming into the law. The privileges have thus
survived two winnowings of the law by eminent scholars and jurists
who were inclined to treat the privileges in general as "obstructions
to truth."
It is fairly clear that the privileges represent in the minds of
most people something of great importance. The privileges are too
closely related to rights of privacy and security-rights considered
essential to happiness and freedom-to be given up in the interests of
improving trial procedure. Dean Griswold 5 quotes Pierce Butler:
It has always been recognized in this country, and it is well to
remember, that few if any of the rights of the people guarded by
fundamental law are of greater importance to their happiness and
safety than the right to be exempt from all unauthorized, arbi-
trary or unreasonable inquiries and disclosures in respect of their
personal and private affairs. 16
This process of first eliminating the privileges and then putting
them back in again is interestingly illustrated with respect to the
Model Code and the Uniform Rules in the instance of the physician-
14 Uniform Rule of Evidence 39.
15 Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today 28 (1955).
16 Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 292 (1929). That this desire for pro-
tection of personal privacy is not a mere sentimental hangover from an earlier day, see
the additional statement of Edgerton, Circuit judge, in Mullen v. United States, 263
F.2d 275, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1958):
I think a communication made in reasonable confidence that it will not be
disclosed, and in such circumstances that disclosure is shocking to the moral
sense of the community, should not be disclosed in a judicial proceeding,
whether the trusted person is or is not a wife, husband, doctor, lawyer, or
minister. As Mr. Justice Holmes said of wire-tapping, "We have to choose, and
for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
Government should play an ignoble part." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 470, 48 S. Ct. 564, 575, 72 L. Ed. 944 (dissenting opinion).
See also the dissent of Frankfurter, J., in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 17
(1940), referring to the "inviolability of a person" as resting on "considerations akin to
what is familiarly known ... as the liberties of the subject." The Sibbach case was deal-
ing not with evidentiary privilege, however, but with the problem of compelling a party
to submit to a physical examination.
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patient privilege. In the first drafts the Model Code did not include
the privilege, but the membership of the American Law Institute in the
1942 meeting voted to include it.'7 The vote came after a vigorous
plea from a representative of the medical profession to the meeting
and after a strong protest from the Code reporter.'8 From the dis-
cussions it is evident that the lawyers were a little embarrassed about
rejecting a privilege for doctors and their patients while at the same
time keeping one for themselves in their professional relationships.
Of course the lawyers have reasons the doctors do not have, but it was
the lawyers who were doing the voting. They were reminded by the
reporter that if the doctors were doing the voting it would be pretty
certain that they would set up a physician-patient privilege and vote
out the lawyer-client privilege. The lawyers simply did not have the
temerity to vote the doctors out of the privilege and keep one for
themselves, particularly while the doctors were watching.
The draftsmen for the Uniform Rules went through a similar
pattern of action. First the physician-patient privilege was excluded
and then later voted in by the membership of the Conference on Uni-
form State Laws.'9 Maybe the doctors were not invited to state their
views this time for the draftsmen of the Uniform Rules placed Rule 27
in brackets as a kind of take-it-or-leave-it posture. This suggests the
wisdom of the first decision to leave it out.
The Model Code further exemplified its basic unfriendliness to
many of the privileges by Rule 233: "If a privilege to refuse to
disclose, or a privilege to prevent another from disclosing, a matter
is claimed and allowed, the judge and counsel may comment thereon,
and the trier of fact may draw all reasonable inferences thereon."
As noted in the Comment to Rule 233, this problem is one on which
there is sharp conflict in the authorities. The tenor of the Comment,
however, is that the lessening of the value of the privilege by allowing
judge and counsel to comment upon the claim of privilege and the trier
to draw inferences therefrom is comparatively slight. This reasoning
contrasts with most of the argument, judicial and otherwise, that
comment ought to be allowed in order to weaken the effect of the
claim of privilege, or that comment ought not to be allowed because
to do so is to deny the protection of the privilege."0 It seems fair to
conclude that Rule 233 reflected disapproval of the claim and allowance
of privilege. One commentator suggested that the draftsmen of the
17 19 ALI Proceedings 183.
18 19 ALI Proceedings 211.
19 Uniform Rule of Evidence 27 (comment).
20 See McCormick § So.
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Model Code were basically unsympathetic with the privilege against
self-incrimination but felt that it was not expedient to attempt its
outright abrogation, proposing instead "a more devious attack upon
the privilege, by lessening its significance and perhaps pointing the
way to its ultimate destruction."'2 1 The Uniform Rules retreated from
this position of the Model Code by restoring the rule followed by most
American jurisdictions barring comment upon the exercise of a
privilege22 save in the case of the privilege against self-incrimination
23
As to the privilege against self-incrimination, the allowance of comment
is restricted to comment by counsel, not the judge, and is coupled with
a bar to showing the criminal record of one who has taken the stand
in his own defense.
The device of Rule 9 of the Model Code and of Rule 7 of the
Uniform Rules of placing the law of privilege and witness disqualifi-
cation into a common category with the exclusionary rules (principally
hearsay) of exceptions to the admissibility of relevant evidence ignores
the basic difference in the nature of privilege and the concept of rele-
vancy. As already noted, much of the law of privilege lies in recognition
of those rights which have come to be considered as basic to the
existence of a society of free men. These surely include the right to
inviolability of the person, the right to personal privacy, the right to
have confidences kept free from compelled disclosure, the right not
to be required by governmental process to incriminate one's self, and the
right to security of one's person, houses, papers and effects. The law
of evidence is thought to be largely procedural, attuned to practical
ends and to getting on with the case directly and expeditiously. Much
of it is. But the law of privilege, at least in the area of personal rights,
has substantive aspects which are too pervasive, too much bound up in
the enforcement of those rights, to permit them to be dealt with as
mere procedural aids or handicaps to the resolution of private litigation.
This is, of course, just what the Uniform Rules attempt to do. For
example, Rule 25(c) of the Uniform Rules reads: "No person has the
privilege to refuse to furnish or permit the taking of samples of body
fluids or substances for analysis. . . ." The rule is taken from
Rule 205(b) of the Model Code and both the Uniform Rules and Model
Code comments state that what is dealt with is only the privilege
against self-incrimination. Both attempt to leave open the question of
whether resistance to forceable extraction of bodily substances is justified
21 Falknor, "The American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence," 18 Wash.
L. Rev. 228, 232 (1943).
22 Uniform Rule of Evidence 39.
23 Uniform Rule of Evidence 23(4).
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under any other rule of law. "The rule does not attempt to solve that
constitutional question, but limits its application strictly to the
privilege against self-incrimination" says the comment to Uniform
Rule 25(c). This attempt to separate the privilege from self-incrimi-
nation from the constitutional immunity seems but an attempt to
separate the privilege from the policy which supports it. Prior to the
case of Mapp v. Ohio24 and particularly in the light of Wolf v. Colo-
rado, 2 the views of the draftsmen of the Uniform Rules that exclusion
was actually no part of the privilege had support in many cases. Mr.
Justice Cardozo's blundering constable21 lived on though he had become
a pretty skilled electronic wiretapper and eavesdropper. The opinion
in Mapp, however, leaves little room for further separation of privilege
and exclusionary rule in the area of constitutional immunities. While
the Mapp case concerned the right to privacy from unlawful searches
and seizures, the Court makes it clear that the exclusion doctrine is an
essential part of the privilege: "To hold otherwise is to grant the right
but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment" 2 7 The majority
opinion takes pains to point up the significance of the decision in
related areas, including that of coerced confessions:
Indeed, we are aware of no restraint, similar to that rejected today,
conditioning the enforcement of any other basic constitutional right.
The right to privacy, no less important than any other right care-
fully and particularly reserved to the people, would stand in
marked contrast to all other rights declared as "basic to a free
society." This Court has not hesitated to enforce as strictly against
the States as it does against the Federal Government the rights
of free speech and of a free press, the rights to notice and to a
fair, public trial, including, as it does, the right not to be convicted
by use of a coerced confession, however logically relevant it be, and
without regard to its reliability. And nothing could be more certain
than that when a coerced confession is involved, "the relevant
rules of evidence" are overridden without regard to "the incidence
of such conduct by the police," slight or frequent. Why should not
the same rule apply to what is tantamount to coerced testimony by
way of unconstitutional seizure of goods, papers, effects, documents,
etc.? We find that, as to the Federal Government, the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments and, as to the States, the freedom from
unconscionable invasions of privacy and the freedom from convic-
tions based upon coerced confessions do enjoy an "intimate rela-
tion" in their perpetuation of "principles of humanity and civil
liberty [secured] ...only after years of struggle." They express
24 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
21 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
26 "The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered." Cardozo, J., in
People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 58S, 587 (1926).
27 Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 24, at 656.
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"supplementing phases of the same constitutional purpose-to
maintain inviolate large areas of personal privacy." The philosophy
of each Amendment and of each freedom is complementary to,
although not dependent upon, that of the other in its sphere of
influence-the very least that together they assure in either sphere
is that no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional evidence.[Citations omitted] .28
The concurring opinions point out the significance of the ruling for
cases such as Rochin v. California.29 It seems clear, therefore, that in
the realm of constitutional privilege the exclusionary rule is an essential
ingredient of the privilege and can no longer be considered apart from
it. This development was not entirely unanticipated by cases decided
between the time the Uniform Rules were written and the decision in
Mapp, but it does make the relevancy approach of the Model Code
and the Uniform Rules particularly inappropriate as a theoretical basis
for workable rules in this area. It seems inappropriate in areas other
than those involving constitutional privilege also, for they too have
as their justification considerations other than relevancy. With respect
to these privileges there has been no suggestion that the privilege could
exist separately from the rule which excluded the evidence. The prob-
lem with respect to these privileges seems to be the manner of adminis-
tration by the courts, whether granted freely in accordance with the
policy which supports them, or administered with a niggardly hand.
However viewed, these privileges are ill-suited tools for the car-
rying on of adversary litigation and the interests of private litigants
cannot be depended upon to protect them or to secure their observance.
They are, however, a necessary part of trial procedure for it is usually
under the duress of trial that the rights protected by the privileges
come into jeopardy. The law of evidence cannot escape them by
assuming that it would be better off without them.
The Model Code of Evidence did not fulfill the hopes of its
sponsors as a code for it was never enacted by any legislature as a
code or adopted by a court as rules of practice. The Uniform Rules,
now almost ten years old, are succeeding only a little better through
partial adoption in one state and through recommendations by com-
mittees in other states.
28 Id. at 656-657.
29 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
The overruling of Wolf v. Colorado by Mapp v. Ohio is acutely discussed in Allen,
"Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf" in Kurland, Supreme
Court Review 1961; Broeder, "The Decline and Fall of Wolf v. Colorado," 41 Neb.
L. Rev. 185 (1961).
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The rule of the Weeks case,"0 rejected by both the Model Code
and the Uniform Rules as illogical and grossly sentimental,3 ' has ap-
parently become the capstone of constitutional privilege. This may
not be an unmixed misfortune for the cause of the Uniform Rules; it
may actually be a blessing in disguise. The concern, expressed in some
of the commentary following the promulgation of the Uniform Rules,
that alteration of rules of privilege involved weighing of policy of the
kind usually considered to be a legislative function, can probably be set
at rest. 2 As far as the constitutional privileges are concerned, courts
can hardly be said to be exceeding their proper judicial function in
adopting rules of court which give effect to the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court holding that observance of the constitutional
privileges is required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead of at-
tempting to ignore constitutional problems involved, the Uniform Rules
can now embody Fourteenth Amendment rights without doing violence
to the proper separation of legislative and judicial functions. No state
supreme court could very well be said to be "legislating" beyond its
power from now on if it declares as rules of court the exclusionary
rules imposed by the United States Supreme Court as essential in-
gredients of constitutional privilege. Paradoxically, the emphasis of the
Mapp decision and others on the substantive aspects of the privileges
should then ease the acceptance of the Uniform Rules, though the
original design was to keep them procedural by the device of specifi-
cally excluding constitutional problems.
Some revision of the Uniform rules to include the exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence would seem to be desirable. Bringing the
Uniform Rules into line with Rochin and Mapp and Rogers would erase
the nearly impossible attempt to divide the indivisible and should place
the Uniform Rules into more acceptable posture for adoption as the
rules of evidence for the federal courts.33
30 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). For a leading state decision sup-
porting the Weeks rule, see People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
31 Gard, "The Uniform Rules," 31 Tul. L. Rev. 19, 26 (1936). The author states:
We take the view that the rule of Weeks v. United States, even in its some-
what modified application in federal practice, is illogical, grossly sentimental and
a device for the administration of justice by indirection-sometimes doubtful
justice at that. Naturally our omission of such a rule will not prevent the
courts from continuing to exclude such evidence if the fallacy of extending the
Fourth Amendment to that extreme is adhered to.
32 Louisell and Crippin, "Evidentiary Privileges," 40 Minn. L. Rev. 413, 436 (1956).
33 See Rules of Evidence: "A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and Feasibility
of Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts," Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the judicial Conference of the United
States (1962).
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The problem of policy change by court rule as it concerns the
personal privileges should no longer present insurmountable difficulties
to adoption by court rule of the Uniform Rules. We no longer consider
procedure and substance as separable categories and there is develop-
ing support for restoring to courts the historic function of control
over the administration of justice.34
As pointed out above, the development of the law of privilege
was the determination of policy by the courts and it should not be
said that the law in this area has now lost its ability to change with the
changing affairs of men.
The notion that the cause of truth is served if all the relevant
evidence is brought to bear upon the factual issues between disputing
litigants but is somehow harmed when testimony is barred in the
interests of preserving an individual's right to privacy or in preserving
his confidences from forced and unwanted disclosure, or in the interest
of refusing to require an accused to incriminate himself, is not a meri-
torious one. It places too slight a regard upon the values which the
privileges sustain. The rationale of any of our evidential privileges is
subject to re-examination. Careful consideration may modify or bring
a privilege into discard, but it ought to be done on the basis that the
privilege has outlived its service to humankind and not on the ground
that "it suppresses the truth."
Moreover, the mental processes by which a ruling is made on
admissibility is necessarily different from those by which a claim of
privilege is sustained or denied. Admissibility or inadmissibility is
based upon the logic of presentation of a case to the trier. The ruling
is made upon the value of the offered evidence as evidence. The ruling
has to be made upon a determination of whether the proffered evidence
would move the case forward or have the effect of leading the in-
quiry into side issues or clouding the important issues with matters of
irrelevancy or prejudice. Here the problems are ones of logic and
clear reasoning aided by the craftsmanship and skill with which
counsel present the case. A claim of privilege, however, calls for
reasoning of a different order on the part of the judge. The first con-
siderations are not those of the trial itself, or should not be if the
privilege invoked is to serve the policy which sustains it. This policy
must be taken into account and the logic of the single trial must give
way to the logic of the whole of society. The architecture of the case
34 Levin and Amsterdam, "Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making," 107
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 22 (1958); Clapp, "Privilege Against Self-Incrimination," 10 Rutgers
L. Rev. 511, 562-73 (1956). For an historical treatment of judicial rule-making power,
see Sunderland, "The Exercise of the Rule-Making Power," 12 A.BAJ. 548 (1926).
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may have to be altered in order that the architecture of the social order
is not impaired.
The attitudes incumbent upon a judge presented with a privilege
ruling are appreciative rather than coldly logical, sympathetic with
the purposes to be fulfilled by his judgment rather than a grudging
reluctance to permit a litigant's case to be impededY A positive distaste
for crude and calloused methods in the administration of law would
seem to be necessary judicial equipment.
Privileges ought to be accorded freely or not at all. This grudging
attitude in allowing what the law says should be freely given breeds a
kind of schizophrenia in our administration of justice. Sound policy
ought not to be served with a niggardly hand; unsound policy ought to
be discarded. Our law ought not to make the eavesdropper a bene-
factor." If the Uniform Rules of Evidence will bend to the newer
attitudes, they will succeed where the Model Code has not.
35 For an example of such judicial attitude, see the statement of Edgerton, J., supra
note 16.
36 Uniform Rule of Evidence 26 has eliminated the eavesdropper as a factor to be
considered in case of the lawyer-client privilege. Apparently he must still be considered
in the case of marital communications.
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